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before and after SOX 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on pay-performance 
sensitivity of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We compare managers’ pay-performance 
sensitivity before and after 2001-2002, a period during which regulatory changes were 
initiated to increase scrutiny over managerial manipulation and improve financial 
reporting quality.  Based on ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2005 (and excluding the 
years 2001 and 2002), our results show that pay-performance sensitivity using either 
market-based or accounting-based measures of performance increased significantly 
following these events. When we further decompose executive pay into its cash-based 
and equity-based components, we find evidence of an increase in the link between 
performance and executive compensation for five of six measures for each performance 
metric. The evidence presented here is consistent with an improvement in the perceived 
credibility of reported earnings and an increased reliance on earnings in compensation 
contracts, which in turn resulted in an increase in the link between executive 
compensation and shareholder wealth.  
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1. Introduction 
  Researchers have long identified poor executive compensation practices among 
the possible sources of the troubles plaguing corporate America. Gordon (2002) and 
Coffee (2004) both include compensation-related problems near the top of their lists 
when analyzing the demise of Enron and its possible causes and repercussions. Although 
the words used vary, the typical complaint about executive pay has been relatively 
consistent: the pay executives receive is not adequately aligned with results they 
produce.1 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact, if any, on pay-performance 
sensitivity of the changes brought forth by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX). We chose to examine pay-performance sensitivity at this time because we are 
interested in the effects of regulatory monitoring on the relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance, and the passage of SOX provides an ideal setting to 
study these relationships. The relation between executive pay and firm performance is 
generally captured in the literature by the measurement of pay-performance sensitivity, 
which has been most often defined as the dollar change in executive wealth associated 
with a dollar change in shareholder value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
For several years prior to the passage of SOX, executive pay soared, with the 
economic rationale being that companies were competing for the best talent. As the 
scandals shortly after the turn of the century impaired public confidence, the support for 
                                                 
1 Business practitioner and popular press also complained that “pay-performance sensitivity” was too low. 
For example, “Have they no shame? Their performance stank last year, yet most CEOs got paid more than 
ever” (Fortune, April 28, 2003). Also see “End the Madness of Excessive CEO Pay” (The Huffington Post, 
February 6, 2009). However, it should be recognized that higher pay-performance sensitivity is not 
universally regarded as a plus. Critics argue that performance can be manipulated by executives to such a 
degree that high levels of pay-performance sensitivity do not always reflect “true” effort (as opposed to 
manipulative or non-productive effort). 
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this justification dwindled. The changes brought forth by SOX affect both financial 
reporting and the greater business community. We examine whether these changesaltered 
executives’ pay-performance sensitivity. In our empirical analyses, we control for other 
contemporaneous changes, such as alterations in financial reporting standards (for 
example, FASB recommended the voluntary expensing of stock options in the early 
2000s, followed soon after by mandatory expensing), and the bursting of the “tech” 
bubble. We do not attempt to evaluate the total welfare effect brought upon by SOX. 
Rather, we focus on changes in the link between pay and performance, and in so doing, 
we draw inferences regarding one important aspect of societal welfare. 
We hypothesize that executive pay-performance sensitivity should increase after 
the passage of SOX if the legislation succeeded in accomplishing certain of its objectives. 
First, tenets of SOX were aimed at strengthening corporate governance in the U.S. If the 
passage of SOX succeeded in reducing managers’ potential for self-serving 
manipulations, then managers might be expected to concentrate more extensively on 
productive effort, provided they were rewarded for doing so. If shareholders anticipate 
this, we would expect to see pay-performance sensitivity to increase in the wake of SOX 
as a mechanism to encourage managers to exert effort on behalf of their shareholders. 
Second, SOX strove to improve the quality of financial reporting, an aim that has been 
substantiated in some prior studies (Koh et al. 2006; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Bartov and 
Cohen 2007; among others). As accounting information becomes more reliable (or is 
believed to be so), shareholders are more likely to use it as the performance measure in 
executive compensation contracts (Carter et al., 2009; Kalelkar and Nwaeze, 2011), 
leading to an improved link between executive pay and performance. 
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Several prior studies also examine the change in executive pay after SOX. Carter 
et al. (2009) focus on the association between executives’ bonus compensation and 
earnings management in the context of SOX. They find that the positive association that 
already existed between bonus payments and earnings before SOX increased subsequent 
to its passage. Firms that exhibit the largest decrease in income-increasing accruals after 
SOX show the largest increase in the weight placed on earnings changes in bonus 
contracts. Cohen et al. (2011) argue that the passage of SOX imposed additional risk on 
CEOs by making them personally responsible for reported financial information. As a 
result, the CEOs’ optimal pay structure changed to reflect the extra risk. Specifically, 
Cohen et al. (2011) find an increase in the fixed portion of pay and a decrease in the 
variable portion. They also present evidence of reduced investments in research and 
development and in capital expenditures after SOX, a possible consequence of CEOs 
becoming more risk-averse. Chang et al. (2011) examine SOX-related changes in 
executives’ stock ownership as well as pay-performance sensitivity. While they find no 
change in stock ownership and in pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs in regulated 
industries, they find significant decreases in both metrics for CEOs in unregulated 
industries in their sample. In general, their findings indicate a weakened incentive 
alignment between CEOs and shareholders. 
We draw upon these studies, but extend our analyses to include all components of 
compensation, both cash and non-cash, and to include not only CEOs but all top 
executives. We further explore the differential reaction to SOX among two subsamples of 
executives: CEOs and CFOs, and other executives. Thus, our study is more 
comprehensive than prior studies in its direct investigation of the alteration in pay-
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performance sensitivity and its components before and after this period of turmoil and 
consequent change. It also serves to reconcile the seemingly conflicting findings of prior 
studies by examining both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. In 
addition, we adopt a comprehensive sample of executives; we apply controls for other 
potentially confounding variables that could affect pay-performance sensitivity; and we 
decompose the sensitivity of performance into all compensation components.  
We choose to examine both accounting earnings and stock market values as 
measures of performance in our analyses, since different types of compensation (cash 
versus equity, for instance) may be linked to differing measures of performance. For 
example, the majority of bonuses in executive compensation contracts have been shown 
to be based on accounting performance (Carter et al., 2009). We first decompose 
compensation into cash and equity-based compensation, and then further decompose 
cash-based compensation into salary and bonuses, and equity-based compensation into 
restricted stocks and options. Based on ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2005, our results 
reveal that both accounting-based sensitivity and market-based sensitivity generally 
increased following SOX, with five of six measures revealing a significant increase in 
each case. The evidence presented here is consistent with an improvement in the 
perceived credibility of reported earnings and an increased reliance on earnings in 
compensation contracts, which in turn resulted in an increase in the link between 
executive compensation and shareholder wealth.  
We further consider possible cross-sectional variation in the change, if any, in 
pay-performance sensitivity. First, we consider potential differences between top 
executives and other managers. As argued by Cohen et al. (2011), the passage of SOX 
 5 
imposed additional risk on CEOs in particular by holding them personally accountable 
for reported financial information, with a resultant shift in the optimal pay structure for 
CEOs. We explore the differential reaction to SOX across two subsamples of executives: 
CEOs and CFOs, and other executives. We group CEOs and CFOs together because the 
risk exposure effect (as hypothesized by Cohen et al. (2011)) applies to both CEOs and 
CFOs. For example, Section 302 of SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to personally sign 
their companies’ financial statements, exposing them to potentially higher personal 
liability and risk than other top executives. However, with the exception of the signing 
requirement, most of the changes aimed at improving the quality of financial information 
(internal control changes, introduction of the PCAOB, added disclosures, etc.) could be 
expected to affect various levels of executive behavior, not merely CEOs and CFOs. 
Thus, we wish to consider whether pay-performance sensitivity after SOX changed 
differentially for CEOs and CFOs versus other executives. If, for instance, CEOs and 
CFOs were motivated to exert greater effort due to closer monitoring, but to behave more 
conservatively due to higher risk exposure (and to demand altered compensation 
contracts accordingly), we might observe a mitigating or offsetting effect, with less of an 
increase in pay-performance sensitivity (or even a decrease). Our results are consistent 
with this conjecture; i.e., the observed increase is stronger and more consistent across 
specifications in the subsample of other executives than in the sample of CEOs and CFOs.  
Next, consistent with Chang et al. (2012), we consider potential differences 
between regulated and unregulated firms with respect to pay-performance sensitivity. 
Chang et al. (2012) find that while pay-performance sensitivity decreased for executives 
in unregulated industries following SOX, it increased for executives in regulated 
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industries. To consider whether our findings were driven by firms in regulated industries, 
we repeat our analyses on a sample excluding regulated industries, and the results remain 
unchanged. The evidence presented here suggests that the changes improved the 
perceived credibility of reported earnings in general, not just for firms in regulated 
industries, and that the increased reliance on earnings in compensation contracts after 
SOX led to an increase in the link between executive compensation and shareholder 
wealth.  This evidence complements that presented in the context of earnings 
management and voluntary disclosure, which also support positive effects of SOX on 
earnings quality (Cahan and Zhang, 2006; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Koh 
et al., 2006, among others).  
Our findings have implications consistent with the effectiveness of SOX in 
reducing agency cost and improving overall corporate governance in the U.S. By 
improving financial reporting quality and providing more managerial discipline, SOX led 
to generally higher pay-performance sensitivity, thus realigning manager-shareholder 
interests and providing more incentives for managers to exert productive effort. While 
our study does not attempt to evaluate the overall welfare effects of SOX, our findings 
suggest that one important aspect, i.e., the alignment of managerial incentives and effort, 
shows evidence of improvement.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background and motivation for our analysis. Section 3 presents our methodology and 
describes sample and data. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis, and Section 5 
concludes the study.  
 
 7 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
To protect shareholders and restore public confidence in corporate America after 
Enron and several other scandals around 2001, U.S. regulators passed a piece of 
legislation, i.e., SOX, aimed at raising the potential penalty levels for both managers and 
auditors found to be at fault. A more extensive set of legal requirements was thus 
imposed on the corporate governance and financial reporting of public companies.   
For example, the passage of SOX led to the creation of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which serves as the auditor of the auditors. This 
legislation requires public accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies to be 
registered with the PCAOB, and to subject themselves to inspections on a regular basis. 
Any firm auditing more than 100 publicly traded client firms must be inspected annually, 
while firms not meeting the 100-audits threshold are subject to inspection every three 
years. PCAOB, as a non-profit organization reporting to the SEC, claims to represent and 
protect the interests of the shareholders. By committing to inspect the auditors, the Board 
creates an extra tool for shareholders to reduce agency problems. 
Furthermore, SOX required CEOs and CFOs to sign their companies’ financial 
statements, attesting to their accuracy. The Act also created potential criminal liability for 
the destruction of records, even when conforming to an otherwise applicable records 
management policy and even if no federal investigation was in process at the time the 
records were destroyed. An individual can be charged with obstruction of justice 
(carrying 20 years imprisonment) for destroying evidence if he/she should have known to 
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preserve the document for any possible future government inquiries.2 The above 
measures implemented by SOX significantly increased the discipline over managers’ 
behavior by imposing harsher potential consequences for managerial misconduct. As a 
result, executives are less likely to engage in manipulation and opportunism, and more 
likely to focus on productive efforts after SOX.  
Another primary goal of SOX was to improve the quality of financial reporting. 
Li et al. (2008) find a positive stock market response to the passage of SOX, which they 
interpret as evidence of investors’ anticipation of constraint of earnings management and 
enhanced financial statement quality resulting from SOX. Similarly, Jain and Rezaee 
(2006) find that the market reacted positively (negatively) to events indicative of 
increased (decreased) likelihood of SOX passage. This early evidence is consistent with a 
prediction that investors expected improved managerial effort and alignment of 
shareholder-manager interests.  Several researchers (e.g., Koh et al., 2006; Lobo and 
Zhou, 2006; Gordon et al., 2006; Bartov and Cohen, 2007; Carter et al., 2009) present 
evidence consistent with an improvement in financial reporting quality in the wake of 
SOX, implying that accounting numbers became a more reliable base for executive 
compensation.3 Kalelkar and Nwaeze (2011) find that the weights the investors put on 
earnings and earnings components for valuation purpose increased significantly after the 
passage of SOX, indicating the market perception of the reliability of earnings and 
earnings components improved. Carter et al. (2009) further show that the bonus portion 
                                                 
2 SOX also induced extra scrutiny from inside the companies. For example, Burks (2010) shows that the 
discipline by boards on CEOs and CFOs for accounting restatements became more severe after SOX. 
Specifically, the boards take harsher actions against top executives in the form of reductions in bonus 
payouts. 
3 On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2010) find no evidence that overall earnings management decreased post-
SOX. 
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of executive compensation increased, linking this increase to improved accounting 
measures.  
Taken together, we argue that the requirements imposed by SOX were likely to 
have curbed managers’ manipulation of financial data while encouraging their productive 
efforts. These two effects could both potentially increase the link between the managers’ 
pay and performance. Thus, we predict an increase in the overall pay-performance 
sensitivity after SOX. On the other hand, some evidence has emerged that managers 
switched in the wake of SOX from earnings management via accruals and other 
accounting measures to increased “real” management, rather than to increased effort on 
the behalf of their shareholders (Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, we acknowledge the 
possibility of mitigating factors, which could work against our hypothesis. Ultimately, the 
net effect is an empirical question. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Model 
Our sample period extends from 1993 through 2005, and we test whether SOX 
and related events have caused a significant change in the pay-performance sensitivity, 
tested using both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. The 
scandals that began in 2001 (Enron, among others) had resulted in increased scrutiny by 
the following year. These events led to the passage of SOX; and although many of its 
tenets were not in place at once, the climate of change (both present and forthcoming) 
was already clear.  
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To examine the impact of SOX and related events on the sensitivity between 
executive compensation and market-based performance, we estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
∆lnTOTAL_PAYj,t = α0 + α1∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t + α2POST+ α3lnASSETSj,t  
 + α4∆lnIND_PERFORMANCEj,t + α5BMj,t + α6OWNj,t + α7CLOSEHELDj,t  
 + α8OPTION%j,t + α9TECHj,t + α10REGULATEDj,t + α11INVESTj,t  
 +α12POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t + α13lnASSETS*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t 
 + α14∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t 
 + α15BM*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t + α16OWN*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t 
 + α17CLOSEHELD*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t  
 + α18OPTION%*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t 
 + α19TECH*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t  
 + α20REGULATED*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t 
 + α21INVEST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUEj,t + εj,t (1) 
 
Year effects are included in the model but are not reported in the results section.  The 
dependent variable ∆lnTOTAL_PAY is the yearly change in the natural log of total 
executive compensation; and ∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE is the yearly change in the natural 
log of shareholder value.4   
                                                 
4 An alternative specification sometimes used to analyze pay-performance sensitivities is: ∆(Executive Pay) 
= a + b∆(Shareholder Value), where b is interpreted as “pay-performance sensitivity.” In contrast, the 
regression coefficient, B, in our specification is sometimes referred to as “pay-performance elasticity”: 
∆ln(Executive Pay) = A + B∆ln(Shareholder Value). ∆ln(Shareholder Value) ignores share issues or 
repurchases and therefore equals a continuous rate of return on common stock, r. We can also express our 
specification as ∆ln(Executive Pay) = A + Bln(1+r). 
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Our variable of interest is the interaction term, POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE, 
where POST is an indicator variable set equal to one for years from 2003 onward, and 
zero for years up through 2000. We exclude both 2001 and 2002 from the pre- and post-
periods in our analysis as there was a great deal of change and tumult during both years, 
and arbitrarily assigning 2001 and 2002 to either pre- or post-periods could bias our 
analyses.5 A positive coefficient estimate for this interaction term supports our hypothesis, 
indicating an increase in pay-performance sensitivity after the passage of the SOX Act. 
We subsequently perform tests where executive pay is decomposed to determine which 
components are associated most closely with changes in firm performance. We report 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. 
We control for variables that prior research has found to be related to executive 
pay or to pay-performance sensitivity. The control variables included are firm size 
(lnASSETS), industry performance (∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), executive ownership (OWN), closely-held ownership (CLOSEHELD), stock 
options as a percentage of total executive compensation (OPTION%), whether the firm is 
in the technology industry (TECH) or regulated industry (REGULATED), and 
investments (INVEST). The coefficients on the control variables allow us to consider the 
effect of each on compensation (or its components), while the interactions between 
∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE and each of the control variables would reveal the association, if 
any, between pay-performance sensitivity and each variable. Our primary focus in this 
paper and in the following paragraphs is on the characteristics related to pay-performance 
sensitivity measures, as shown in prior literature. The purpose of the interactive terms is 
                                                 
5 We also estimate our regression with the years 2001 and 2002 included in the PRE period, since many of 
the changes from SOX had not been implemented yet, though the climate was clearly set for change. Those 
results are summarized in a subsequent footnote. 
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to control for other factors that might have caused changes in pay-performance sensitivity 
independent of SOX and its consequences.   
The relation between firm size and pay-performance sensitivity is not clear-cut. 
Both Schaefer (1998) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that pay-performance 
sensitivity decreases with firm size, while others (Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and Guay, 
1999) argue that the level of equity incentives may increase at a decreasing rate with firm 
size as executives in larger firms are both more highly compensated and have greater 
equity-related incentives. We measure firm size as the natural log of total assets at the 
fiscal year end.  
Additionally, we control for industry performance (∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE) 
in our regression, where ∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE equals the average yearly change in 
the natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat companies in the same two-digit 
SIC code. Filbeck et al. (2012) show that SOX may impact different industries in 
different ways. Also, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find that changes in CEO pay are 
positively related to firm performance, but negatively related to industry performance. 
Their findings support the theory of relative performance evaluation in that CEOs are 
rewarded not only on the basis of absolute performance, but also on performance 
“relative to other firms in the industry or market in order to filter common risk from the 
compensation of risk-averse managers” (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990).6  
Both Smith and Watts (1992) and Core and Guay (1999) find a positive relation 
between a firm’s growth opportunities and the extent to which the firm uses equity 
incentives to tie a manager’s wealth to firm value. Following their studies, we include the 
                                                 
6 This variable is more directly related to compensation than to pay-performance sensitivity, and we 
estimate the regression both with and without its interaction with performance, and our results are robust to 
the inclusion or exclusion of the interactive term. 
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book-to-market ratio (BM) as a proxy for expected growth in a firm’s operations. BM is 
measured as book value of common equity divided by market capitalization. Firms with 
higher growth opportunities will have lower book-to-market ratios. Previous research 
suggests that executive equity ownership fosters managerial behavior more consistent 
with stockholders’ interests (Palia, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999). Therefore, we control 
for executive ownership (OWN), measured as the percentage of total common shares 
(excluding stock options) owned by executives.  
We also consider other potentially confounding events, such as the mandated 
disclosure or expensing of stock option grants and the bursting of the tech bubble, either 
of which could affect pay-performance sensitivity. Craighead et al. (2004) suggest that 
corporate governance improves more following mandated compensation disclosures in 
firms with dispersed ownership than in closely-held firms, where the Board represents 
shareholder interests better in the absence of a mandate. Both the mandated disclosure 
and, subsequently, the expensing of stock options took place in the U.S. during our 
sample period.  The required expensing of stock options might be expected to affect 
executive compensation, either in the total amount of compensation or in the structure of 
compensation packages, as many companies decreased the amount of options granted or 
replaced stock options with other forms of compensation (i.e., bonuses, restricted stock 
granted, etc.) in response to the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act passed in 2003. 
Following Craighead et al. (2004), we include a variable that captures the percentage of 
total executive pay consisting of stock options (OPTION%) and a variable that identifies 
whether a firm is closely held (CLOSEHELD) to control for the extent to which a 
particular company was likely to be affected by the changes in disclosures and expense 
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reporting. The bursting of the tech bubble between 2000 and 2001 led to the loss by 
technology companies of almost 5 trillion dollars of market value, drawing widespread 
attention. We add an indicator variable for all tech firms to consider this possible industry 
effect (TECH).   
Finally, we add an indicator variable to control for the extent to which regulated 
industries are differentially affected by SOX (REGULATED). Cohen et al. (2011) 
document a reduction of risky investments and CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity 
following SOX. We include the variable INVEST to control for the extent to which the 
relation between executive pay and firm performance is likely to be affected by any shift 
in investment decisions.  
To consider the sensitivity between executive compensation components and 
accounting earnings, we decompose total executive pay in two different ways. First, we 
decompose the total pay into cash-based compensation (i.e., sum of salaries and bonuses) 
and equity-based compensation (i.e., sum of options and restricted stock granted), and 
then we further decompose cash-based compensation into salaries and bonuses, and 
equity-based compensation into options and restricted stock granted.7 We analyze the 
relation between firm performance and each of the pay components. 
Executive compensation plans often include a stated objective of firm value 
maximization but formally tie compensation to an accounting-based measure of firm 
value such as earnings. Executive pay packages frequently contain an annual bonus tied 
to accounting performance (Murphy 1999, p. 3). With heightened scrutiny and a more 
                                                 
7 We do not present the regression estimation of the salary component as the dependent variable separately 
since it is not expected to relate as closely to performance measures as the incentive-based components, and 
we find no significant change in pay-performance sensitivity for salaries, either in the accounting-based or 
market-based specification.  
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rigorous auditing environment in 2001, we expect an increase in the reliability of 
accounting performance measures, as previously discussed.   To test this assertion, we 
repeat equation (1), replacing shareholder values with accounting earnings 
(∆lnEARNING) which is the yearly change in the natural log of earnings before 
nonrecurring items. This specification examines changes in pay to performance 
sensitivity where performance is an accounting rather than market-based measure. In this 
accounting-based specification, we include an additional control variable for earnings 
persistence (PERSIST) and its interaction with our performance measure.   
3.2 Data 
We obtain executive compensation data from ExecuComp for the years 1992 
through 2009.8 We use the data from 1992 to compute yearly changes for 1993; thus our 
sample period begins in 1993. We calculate executive pay by summing the following: 
salaries, bonus, value of restricted stock granted, value of stock options granted, long-
term incentive payouts, and other benefits that cannot be easily categorized. The value of 
stock options is obtained from ExecuComp and estimated using the Black-Scholes model 
(as reported by ExecuComp). We obtain financial data from Compustat Industrial Annual 
data files to calculate the average annual industry performance 
(∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and investment (INVEST).  
Our initial sample consists of 165,898 executive-year observations. Missing 
executive total pay data triggers the elimination of 63,419 observations, leaving us with 
102,479 observations. Incomplete financial data results in the elimination of another 
10,057 observations, leaving 92,422 executive-year observations. Figures 1A through 1D 
                                                 
8 Firms included in ExecuComp differ from non-ExecuComp firms in size, complexity, liquidity, etc. 
(Cadman et al., 2010). Therefore, extrapolating our findings to non-ExecuComp firms should be done with 
caution. 
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present a pattern of changes over time in both performance measures and in 
compensation in the period of 1993-2009. However, we focus on 1993 through 2005 in 
our regressions because of the financial crisis in 2007 to 2009, which could confound our 
interpretation. Excluding years 2001 and 2002 data reduces the sample to 77,542 
executive-year observations.9 Our sample is further reduced to 6,930 observations when 
we limit it to firms with non-missing compensation component data to perform our 
multivariate estimation (to 5,782 observations based on total pay and accounting 
performance).  Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive data and summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics related to the change in executive 
compensation components and firm performance over time. Mean total compensation 
increases from $1.80 million in 1993 to $5.45 million in 2000, but decreases to $3.84 
million in 2003 and remains below $5 million through 2005. The proportion of 
compensation from bonuses increases from 1993 to 1995, but shows a decreasing trend 
from 1996 through 1999; however, it increases substantially from 2003 onward and 
remains above 20% through 2005. This pattern may be related to an increase in the use of 
options (in place of bonuses) prior to 2000, and a subsequent decline. The proportion of 
compensation from salaries decreases from 32.94% in 1993 to 24.55% in 2000, rebounds 
to 25.59% in 2003, and drops back to 22.60% in 2005.  
                                                 
9 As mentioned previously, we repeat all analyses with 2001 and 2002 included in the pre- SOX period; our 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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Restricted stock granted as a percentage of total compensation hovers between 15% 
and 18.5% before 2000, but increases from 21.22% in 2003 to 23.53% by 2005. 
Restricted stock is speculated to have replaced stock options for many firms that were 
concerned about the effects on the income statement of the change from the intrinsic 
value method to the fair value method for options as compensation. Consistent with this 
argument, the only portion of variable pay that decreases significantly after 2002 is the 
portion from options.  
Overall, the t-statistics reveal that the average proportion of compensation from 
bonuses, restricted stock granted, the average total compensation, the average change in 
shareholder value and the average change in earnings before nonrecurring items are 
higher in the post-SOX period than pre-SOX, while the average proportion of 
compensation from salary and options, as well as the average change in total 
compensation, are lower in the post-SOX period than pre-SOX.  
Panel B of Table 2 further summarizes the data by regressing each of the 
executive compensation components and shareholder wealth on a time trend (TIME) and 
a dummy variable (POST), similar to the procedure in Cohen et al. (2011). Our linear 
TIME variable is defined as the calendar year minus 1993 to control for the possibility 
that pay-performance sensitivity exhibited a time trend during our sample period that is 
unrelated to the passage of SOX or the accounting scandals that led to its passage. In 
view of the dramatic changes of the last decade, including September 11 and the bursting 
of the technology and dot-com bubble, we were concerned that traditional summary 
statistics could be uninformative due to a lack of stationarity. The results presented in this 
panel indicate significant decreases over time in both bonus and salary compensation, but 
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increases in options and restricted stock-based compensation. The dummy variable, 
POST, is significantly positive for salaries, bonuses, and restricted stock-granted 
compensation, and significantly negative for options, consistent with the trend previously 
documented by Banerjee et al. (2005), Cohen et al. (2011) and Chang et al. (2012)among 
others.10 
Total (or aggregated) compensation increased over time, but decreased 
significantly in the post-SOX period. In direct contrast, the changes in shareholder value 
declined over time with a significant increase after 2002.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Panels A and B of Table 3 report descriptive statistics for our variables and a 
correlation matrix, respectively. The natural logarithm of company total assets averages 
8.36 (the mean total assets at year-end are $4,273 million). The average annual change in 
the natural logarithm of shareholder value of all Compustat companies in the same two-
digit SIC code (∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE) ranges from -1.13 to 1.00. The highest 
correlation is between ∆lnTOTAL_PAY and ∆lnOPTION (around 65%) due to variable 
construction.  However, because executive pay variables are dependent variables in 
separate regressions, the correlation between them does not affect our analysis.  There are 
also noticeable correlations between REGULATED and ∆lnASSETS and between 
                                                 
10 Cohen et al. (2011) suggest that the decrease in option compensation may, in part, be the result of the 
firms’ response to SOX’s requirement for executives to reimburse incentive-based compensation following 
accounting misstatements.  
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REGULATED and INVEST, suggesting that firms in regulated industries appear to be 
larger and invest more than firms in other industries.11     
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Sensitivity of compensation to market-based performance 
Column (a) of Panel A in Table 4 reports the multivariate regression results from 
our estimation of equation (1), using the change in the natural log of total executive 
compensation as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on our variable of interest, 
POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE, is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent 
with an increase in the sensitivity between total executive pay and shareholder value. The 
results are consistent in the market-based performance regressions when we break down 
total executive compensation into cash compensation (i.e., sum of salaries and bonuses) 
and equity compensation (i.e., sum of stock options and restricted stock granted). As seen 
in Columns (b) and (c) of Panel A, Table 4, the coefficients on 
POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the sensitivity between cash compensation and shareholder value, as well as the 
sensitivity between equity compensation and shareholder value increased following SOX.  
When we further decompose executive pay into individual components—bonuses, 
options, and restricted stock granted—we find a significant increase in the sensitivity 
between market-based performance and all components of executive compensation, with 
                                                 
11 Kennedy (2008) suggests that variation inflation factors (VIFs) greater than 10 indicate a potential 
concern about multicollinearity. None of our VIFs exceed this benchmark. We also conducted our analysis 
excluding the variable REGULATED.  The results were qualitatively unchanged. 
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the exception of restricted stock granted.12 These results are presented in Panel B of 
Table 4, and are based on a specification from equation (1), in which the change in 
natural log of each executive compensation component replaces the change in total 
compensation as the dependent variable. Our variable of interest, 
POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE, is positive and significant at the 1% level for two of the 
three component regressions. This evidence is generally consistent with our hypothesis. 
Of the interactive terms, the coefficients on lnASSETS*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE 
are negative and statistically significant in five out of the six regressions, suggesting that 
pay-performance sensitivity decreases with firm size, consistent with Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) and Schaefer (1998). The coefficients on CLOSEHELD*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE 
are negative and statistically significant in three of the six regressions, suggesting that 
closely held firms generally have lower pay for market-based performance sensitivity. 
The coefficients on BM*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE, OPTION%*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE, 
and TECH*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE are of mixed signs and significant in three 
regressions at the 10% level or better. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
4.3 Sensitivity of compensation to accounting-based performance 
We next consider whether the sensitivity between executive pay and accounting-
based performance increased in the post-SOX period (See Table 5). Because executive 
compensation plans often tie certain components of compensation (bonuses, for instance) 
to an accounting-based measure such as earnings, we are interested in ascertaining 
                                                 
12 Restricted stock is the least significant component of compensation, and the lack of significance may 
simply be due to a lack of power in this test. 
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whether the link between compensation and accounting numbers, which are arguably less 
biased for years after 2002, increased following the passage of SOX. If increased reliance 
is placed by shareholders on accounting performance measures in this period, whether 
due to heightened scrutiny or to the expected changes resulting from the SOX Act, we 
would expect that the compensation to accounting performance sensitivity would increase 
from 2003 onward. 
In Column (a) of Panel A in Table 5, the results reveal an increase in pay-
performance sensitivity after 2002, as indicated by the positive coefficient on 
POST*∆lnEARNING, significant at the 1% level. We also examine the sensitivity 
between the various executive compensation components and accounting earnings with 
respect to our variable of interest. In columns (b) and (c) of Panel A, we decompose 
compensation into cash and equity (non-cash) components; then in Panel B we further 
decompose compensation into bonuses, options, and restricted stock. The coefficients on 
POST*∆lnEARNING are positive and statistically significant at the conventional level 
(suggesting an increase in the relation between compensation components and 
accounting-based firm performance) for all components except options (Column b, Panel 
B). These results are consistent with an argument that accounting earnings were viewed 
as generally more reliable in the post-SOX period. Stock options decreased as a 
percentage of total compensation following SOX. The decreasing role of options in total 
compensation may explain the lack of change in the option-performance sensitivity in the 
post-SOX period. 
Coefficients on control variables in Table 5 are similar in sign to those reported in 
Table 4, though significance levels fluctuate. One exception is that the coefficient on 
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OWN*∆lnEARNING is mostly positive in Table 5 (significant in two cases in Table 5, 
insignificant for all components in Table 4), suggesting that pay for accounting-based 
performance sensitivity increases with executive ownership.  This result is consistent 
with the view that executive equity ownership aligns managers’ interests with 
shareholders’. It is also noteworthy that the coefficient on OPTION%*∆lnEARNING is 
significantly positive in both Tables 4 and 5 for those components of compensation most 
clearly linked to security prices (i.e., ∆lnEQUITY COMP and ∆lnOPTION, as well as 
∆lnTOTALPAY) but significantly negative for ∆lnCASH COMP, ∆lnBONUS, and 
∆lnRST STOCK. The negative coefficients are surprising and may suggest a lack of 
emphasis on these components by firms that rely most heavily on options for 
incentivizing managers. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
We conduct several robustness tests that are not reported in the paper. First, we 
repeat our analysis, limiting our sample to CEOs to compare our findings to those of 
Cohen et al. (2011). Consistent with our univariate results, the coefficient on our variable 
of interest remains significantly positive. In particular, we find the coefficients on 
POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE are positive and significant in the regressions where 
∆lnCASH_COMP and ∆lnBONUS are dependent variables, suggesting that CEOs’ bonus 
to shareholder wealth sensitivity increased after 2002. Similarly, we find that the 
coefficient on POST*∆lnEARNING is positive and significant in the regressions where 
∆lnCASH_COMP and ∆lnBONUS are the dependent variables, suggesting that CEOs’ 
bonus to accounting earnings sensitivity increased after 2002.  
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Next, to equalize the number of observations before and after SOX, we conduct 
our regression analysis using only 1993-1995 and 2003-2005 data, and the results are 
similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5.  Third, we eliminate the top and bottom 1% or 
2% of pay and performance observations. Again, our results are not altered qualitatively 
or in terms of statistical significance.  
4.4 Difference between CEO+CFO and other executives 
 In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the effect of SOX on pay-
performance sensitivity by dividing our sample into two subsamples: CEOs and CFOs, 
versus other executives. We wish to consider whether the change in pay-performance 
sensitivity after SOX for the sample of CEOs and CFOs is different from that for other 
top executives, as the CEOs and CFOs are exposed to higher personal risk than other 
executives. The results of these tests are summarized in Table 6 (for market-based 
performance measures) and Table 7 (for accounting-based performance measures).  
 The first column of Panel A in Table 6 shows the effect of SOX on the total pay-
performance sensitivity of the subsample of CEOs and CFOs. The second and third 
columns then decompose the total pay into cash and equity component. Panel B reports 
the effects of SOX on the pay-performance sensitivity of other executives in the same 
order. We find that while the coefficients on POST*∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE are 
significant and positive for all three columns for the subsample of other executives, only 
the coefficient on the cash component of compensation is significant for the subsample of 
CEOs and CFOs.  
 The tests results for accounting-based performance for the two subsamples are 
reported in Table 7. Again, we find that the coefficients on POST*∆lnEARNING are all 
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significant and positive for the subsample of other executives, but only significant for the 
cash component for CEOs and CFOs. These results are consistent with an argument that 
the increase in pay-performance sensitivity is mitigated for CEOs and CFOs, due to their 
additional risk exposure and personal liability, which may lead to more conservative 
choices and a higher “fixed” component of executive pay for these executives relative to 
the earlier period of time. The fact that the increase in pay-performance sensitivity for the 
cash component remains significant likely relates primarily to the use of bonuses as 
incentives.      
5. Conclusion
 We compare managers’ pay-performance sensitivity before and after the passage 
of SOX, a period in which corporate America became enmeshed in accounting scandals 
and the business climate shifted from one of relative nonchalance about managerial 
manipulation to one of heightened scrutiny. By 2001, the atmosphere of the financial 
community was clearly set for change, which was confirmed by the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002.  
Prior studies have examined the effect of SOX from various perspectives. Both Li 
et al. (2008) and Jain and Rezaee (2006) find evidence of a positive stock market 
response to the passage of SOX or to events indicative of the likelihood of its passage. Li 
et al. interpret their findings as evidence that investors anticipated more constrained 
earnings management (and enhanced financial statement quality) in the wake of SOX. 
More recent studies present evidence consistent with these early predictions; i.e., that, in 
response to various tenets of SOX, the quality of financial reporting has improved and the 
discipline of managers tightened (Koh et al., 2006; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cahan and 
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Zhang, 2006, among others). However, the prior studies on the impact of SOX on 
executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity have provided mixed results. 
While we expect improved financial quality and tighter managerial discipline to 
lead to enhanced pay-performance sensitivity, we allow for the possibility that increased 
risk to CEOs and CFOs could have a mitigating (or opposite) effect. We draw upon prior 
studies by Carter et al. (2008), Cohen et al. (2011), and Chang et al. (2012), in structuring 
our research design, but we extend our analyses to include all components of 
compensation, both cash and non-cash, to include not only CEOs but all top executives; 
and to consider both accounting-based and market-based measures of performance. We 
further explore the differential reaction to SOX among two subsamples of executives: 
CEOs and CFOs, and other executives.  
Our results show that pay-performance sensitivity using either market-based or 
accounting-based measures of performance increased significantly following the passage 
of SOX. When we further decompose executive pay into its cash-based and equity-based 
components, we find evidence of an increase in the link between performance and 
executive compensation for five of six measures for each performance metric. The 
evidence presented here is consistent with an improvement in the perceived credibility of 
reported earnings and an increased reliance on earnings in compensation contracts, which 
in turn resulted in an increase in the link between executive compensation and 
shareholder wealth. We find that the reaction was more consistently positive across more 
specifications for the subsample of other executives than for the subsample of CEOs and 
CFOs, suggesting a mitigating effect for these high-risk executives (consistent with the 
arguments advanced by Cohen et al., 2011).  
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Our findings clearly suggest a positive effect of SOX on pay-performance 
sensitivity, from which one can infer improvement in corporate governance and lessened 
agency costs. Higher pay-performance sensitivity is consistent with more productive 
managerial effort and better alignment of shareholder-manager interests. While some 
prior research finds a weakened link between executive pay and performance, our study, 
using a more comprehensive sample and finer decomposition of empirical measures, 
finds the link generally strengthened.  We believe this evidence of an important positive 
consequence of SOX, whether intended or indirect, constitutes a valuable contribution to 
the literature.  
We acknowledge certain limitations of our study. For example, we cannot 
conclude with certainty whether the evidence presented reflects changes in managerial 
behavior induced by SOX or a general shift in shareholder attitudes, as we are unable to 
observe either directly. We do, however, control for contemporaneous changes around 
the time of SOX passage, including the possible effects from the mandated change in the 
accounting for stock options and the bursting of the “tech” bubble. Further, we recognize 
that SOX imposes significant costs on businesses, and the tradeoffs between costs and 
benefits are not addressed here. We do not, and cannot, evaluate the total welfare effect 
of this far-reaching piece of legislation. Rather, we focus on changes in the link between 
executive pay and firm performance, and in so doing, we draw inferences regarding one 
important aspect of societal welfare. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
 
Sample Selection Procedures
Initial sample obtained from ExecuComp 165,898
Less: Missing executive total pay data (63,419)
            Missing financial data (10,057)
            2001 and 2002 data (14,880)
            Missing executive component data (70,612)
Final sample 6,930                    
Number of 
Executive-Year Observations
 34 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Executive Compensation Components and Firm Performance Measures over Time (1993-2006) 
Panel A: Mean value of Executive Compensation Components and Firm Performance Measures 
 
 
aAmounts for total compensation, changes in total compensation, changes in shareholder value, and changes in earnings are given in millions of dollars. 
bTests for difference in means between 1993-2000 and 2003-2005 on various components of compensation.  
*** indicates significant differences in means at the 1% level. 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1993-
2000
Total compensation
a
1.80 1.91 2.10 2.50 3.60 3.31 4.65 5.45 3.29
Bonus as a % of total compensation 19.69% 19.47% 20.61% 20.09% 19.20% 17.45% 16.96% 17.73% 18.81%
Salary as a % of total compensation 32.94% 30.81% 31.81% 28.48% 26.21% 25.94% 25.32% 24.55% 27.84%
Option as a % of total compensation 23.05% 27.31% 22.69% 27.04% 29.35% 31.93% 34.54% 34.20% 29.21%
Restricted stock granted as a % of total 
compensation 16.48% 15.16% 16.66% 16.28% 16.76% 18.43% 16.54% 17.15% 16.76%
∆ in total compensation 0.15 0.32 0.18 0.58 1.16 0.41 1.45 1.08 0.72
∆ in shareholder value -3.34 -300.97 1116.33 590.82 43.58 874.08 -451.34 -58.11 253.78
∆ in earnings before nonrecurring items 55.62 31.41 59.65 63.20 66.20 -16.48 189.09 168.12 78.63
Year 2003 2004 2005
2003-
2005
Total compensation 3.84 4.19 3.99 4.02 4.26 ***
Bonus as a % of total compensation 20.26% 22.11% 21.78% 21.50% 10.58 ***
Salary as a % of total compensation 25.59% 21.81% 22.60% 23.10% -14.76 ***
Option as a % of total compensation 26.21% 25.53% 23.91% 25.03% -10.85 ***
Restricted stock granted as a % of total 
compensation 21.22% 22.59% 23.53% 22.63% 18.66 ***
∆ in total compensation 0.19 0.50 0.37 0.37 -3.50 ***
∆ in shareholder value 1,986.80  861.88 391.02 953.30 4.76 ***
∆ in earnings before nonrecurring items 123.81 192.41 128.34 148.22 5.02 ***
t-test for 
diff. in means
b
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Table 2 
(Continued) 
 
Panel B: Coefficient estimates from regressing executive compensation components and 
change in performance measures on TIME and POST 
 
 
 
The two-tailed t-statistics are in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *** indicates that the 
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
a Amounts for total compensation, changes in total compensation, changes in shareholder value, 
and changes in earnings are given in millions of dollars. 
 
POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data are from 1993-
2000; and 
TIME  = calendar year minus 1993. 
a0 a1 a2
Total compensation
 a
1.404 *** 0.497 *** -2.935 ***
(6.17) (9.65) (-7.00)
Bonus as a % of total compensation 0.202 *** -0.004 *** 0.054 ***
(63.38) (-5.18) (9.26)
Salary as a % of total compensation 0.327 *** -0.013 *** 0.046 ***
(79.25) (-13.59) (6.04)
Option as a % of total compensation 0.235 *** 0.015 *** -0.152 ***
(46.93) (13.29) (-16.56)
Restricted stock granted as a % of 0.156 *** 0.003 *** 0.037 ***
total compensation (39.47) (3.38) (5.01)
∆ in total compensation 0.130 0.154 *** -1.482 ***
(0.95) (5.01) (-5.92)
∆ in shareholder value 701.898 *** -117.891 *** 1567.157 ***
(3.66) (-2.72) (4.44)
∆ in earnings before nonrecurring items 20.356 15.326 *** -43.186
(1.21) (4.03) (-1.39)
Dependent Variables
Dependent Var. = α0 + α1*TIME + α2*POST
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main empirical tests. The 
sample covers the years from 1993-2005 (excluding 2001 and 2002) and contains 6,930 
executive-year observations. 
 
Variable definitions: 
 ∆lnTOTAL_PAY = yearly change in natural log of total executive compensation; 
 ∆lnBONUS = yearly change in natural log of bonus; 
 ∆lnOPTION = yearly change in natural log of stock options; 
 ∆lnRST_STOCK = yearly change in natural log of restricted stock granted; 
 ∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE = yearly change in natural log of shareholder value;  
 ∆lnEARNING = yearly change in natural log of earnings before nonrecurring items; 
 POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data 
are from 1993-2000; 
 lnASSETS = natural log of total assets; 
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE = change in natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code, averaged across sample 
years; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio; 
 OWN = executive ownership calculated as shares (excluding stock options) 
owned by executives, divided by total common shares outstanding; 
 CLOSEHELD = a dummy variable equals to 1 if any shareholder owns more than 
20% of the shares; 
 OPTION% = stock options as a percentage of total compensation; 
Variable n Mean Median Min Max Std Dev
∆lnTOTAL_PAY 6,930  0.14 0.12 -3.22 3.73 0.39
∆lnBONUS 6,930  0.14 0.12 -7.23 5.99 0.64
∆lnOPTION 6,930  0.12 0.12 -5.34 5.90 0.77
∆lnRST_STOCK 6,930  0.16 0.13 -6.51 5.75 0.91
∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE 6,930  0.05 0.09 -2.78 2.10 0.35
∆lnEARNING 6,248  0.19 0.16 -5.00 5.17 0.64
POST 6,930  0.42 0 0 1 0.49
lnASSETS 6,930  8.36 8.16 4.46 14.22 1.72
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE 6,930  0.02 0.02 -1.13 1.00 0.23
BM 6,930  0.44 0.42 -77.58 7.89 1.36
OWN 6,930  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.02
CLOSEHELD 6,930  0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16
OPTION% 6,930  0.27 0.24 0.00 0.97 0.17
TECH 6,930  0.02 0 0 1 0.13
REGULATED 6,930  0.33 0 0 1 0.47
INVEST 6,930  0.08 0.07 -0.11 0.68 0.08
PERSIST 6,511  0.29 0.30 -1.68 2.55 0.36
 37 
 TECH = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first three-digit of SIC code is 
737; 
 REGULATED = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first two-digit of SIC code is 
between 4400 and 5000 or between 6000 and 6999; 
 INVEST = total investments calculated as the sum of research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets; 
 PERSIST = earnings persistence. 
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Table 3 
(Continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrixa 
 
Panel B reports the correlation matrix of the variables used in the main empirical tests. Bold text indicates ρ >|0.40| with significance at 0.05 level 
or better. The lower diagonal of the matrix reports Spearman rank correlations, and the upper diagonal reports Pearson correlations. The sample 
covers the years from 1993-2005 (excluding 2001 and 2002) and contains 6,930 executive-year observations. 
a See Panel A for variable definitions. 
 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
∆lnTOTAL_PAY A 1 0.33 0.67 0.51 0.09 0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.03
∆lnBONUS B 0.42 1 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
∆lnOPTION C 0.64 0.10 1 0.15 0.00 0.04 -0.14 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.35 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03
∆lnRST_STOCK D 0.54 0.18 0.16 1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00
∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE E 0.12 0.26 -0.02 0.10 1 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.34 0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03
∆lnEARNING F 0.21 0.32 0.09 0.10 0.21 1 0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.02
POST G -0.08 0.00 -0.17 0.04 0.15 0.04 1 0.10 0.38 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.11 0.12
lnASSETS H 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.10 1 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.10 0.07 -0.06 0.47 -0.36 -0.06
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE I 0.00 0.07 -0.10 0.04 0.35 0.12 0.37 0.10 1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.00
BM J -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 0.04 0.01 1 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01
OWN K -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.37 0.01 0.07 1 0.23 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05
CLOSEHELD L -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.05 1 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.07
OPTION% M 0.07 -0.07 0.32 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 -0.21 -0.06 0.02 1 0.13 -0.11 0.16 -0.05
TECH N 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.11 1 -0.09 0.17 0.00
REGULATED O 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.46 0.13 0.23 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.09 1 -0.41 0.07
INVEST P -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.38 -0.10 -0.26 -0.04 0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.53 1 -0.06
PERSIST Q -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.11 1
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Table 4 
Sensitivity between Executive Compensation Components and Shareholder Value 
 
 
a b c a b c
INTERCEPT -0.040 0.085 *** -0.171 ***  0.053 -0.424 *** 0.281 ***
(-1.11) (3.62) (-3.00) (0.94) (-6.44) (3.32)
∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE 0.512 *** 0.171 *** 0.573 *** 1.041 *** 0.571 *** 0.398 **
(6.60) (3.34) (4.61) (8.42) (3.97) (2.15)
POST -0.029 -0.053 *** 0.057 -0.079 ** 0.073 * -0.022
(-1.32) (-3.70) (1.63) (-2.31) (1.84) (-0.42)
lnASSETS 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.001 0.024 *** -0.013 ** 0.021 ***
(4.01) (5.41) (0.25) (4.67) (-2.18) (2.71)
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE 0.114 *** 0.008 0.115 ** -0.002 0.183 *** 0.072
(3.87) (0.39) (2.43) (-0.04) (3.35) (1.02)
BM -0.052 *** -0.044 *** -0.036 -0.092 *** 0.063 * -0.172 ***
(-2.85) (-3.65) (-1.24) (-3.18) (1.88) (-3.98)
OWN 0.022 -0.163 -0.044 -0.071 -0.636 0.598
(0.07) (-0.82) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-1.14) (0.83)
CLOSEHELD 0.008 0.024 0.008 0.072 0.003 0.053
(0.28) (1.24) (0.18) (1.56) (0.06) (0.76)
OPTION% 0.301 *** -0.085 *** 0.870 *** -0.304 *** 1.750 *** -0.552 ***
(9.96) (-4.23) (17.94) (-6.30) (31.26) (-7.68)
TECH -0.078 ** 0.098 *** -0.230 *** 0.194 *** -0.312 *** -0.010
(-2.13) (4.08) (-3.94) (3.34) (-4.61) (-0.11)
REGULATED 0.020 * -0.001 0.059 *** 0.006 0.099 *** -0.005
(1.67) (-0.18) (3.05) (0.29) (4.46) (-0.19)
INVEST -0.037 0.029 -0.197 * 0.042 -0.205 -0.215
(-0.55) (0.66) (-1.82) (0.39) (-1.64) (-1.34)
0.106 *** 0.136 *** 0.159 *** 0.296 *** 0.199 *** 0.052
(3.45) (6.67) (3.22) (6.03) (3.48) (0.70)
-0.040 *** -0.007 -0.059 *** -0.091 *** -0.063 *** -0.057 **
(-4.29) (-1.21) (-3.96) (-6.14) (-3.66) (-2.56)
-0.010 -0.009 * -0.001 -0.013 0.035 *** -0.054 ***
(-1.42) (-1.95) (-0.06) (-1.20) (2.77) (-3.31)
-0.487 0.398 -0.905 -0.124 -1.484 -1.095
(-0.59) (0.73) (-0.68) (-0.09) (-0.97) (-0.56)
-0.209 *** -0.028 -0.233 ** -0.143 -0.383 *** -0.079
(-2.90) (-0.60) (-2.02) (-1.25) (-2.86) (-0.46)
-0.203 *** 0.103 ** -0.162 0.317 ** 0.139 0.119
(-2.58) (1.99) (-1.29) (2.52) (0.96) (0.63)
0.037 -0.294 *** 0.129 -0.750 *** -0.063 0.392 *
(0.45) (-5.29) (0.96) (-5.60) (-0.40) (1.96)
0.042 -0.004 0.107 * 0.032 -0.084 0.248 ***
(1.11) (-0.18) (1.78) (0.53) (-1.20) (2.78)
-0.264 -0.262 ** -0.017 -0.299 -0.209 0.551
(-1.61) (-2.42) (-0.07) (-1.15) (-0.69) (1.42)
n 6,930 6,930 6,930 6,930   6,930   6,930  
Adj.R
2
0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.02
F-value 17.70 *** 17.35 *** 21.56 *** 24.40 *** 50.84 *** 5.36 ***
INVEST
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
TECH
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
CLOSEHELD
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
REGULATED
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
BM
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
Panel A: Executive Pay
OWN
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
OPTION%
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
Variable
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
Panel B: Executive Pay Components
lnASSETS
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQUITY
_COMP
POST
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
∆lnBONUS ∆lnOPTION
∆lnRST
_STOCK
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T-statistics are in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates.  
Year dummies are included in the model but are not tabulated. 
*, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
  
Variable definitions: 
 ∆lnTOTAL_PAY = yearly change in natural log of total executive compensation; 
 ∆lnCASH_COMP = yearly change in natural log of cash compensation, calculated as 
the sum of salaries and bonuses; 
 ∆lnEQUITY_COMP = yearly change in natural log of equity compensation, calculated as 
the sum of stock options and restricted stock granted; 
 ∆lnBONUS = yearly change in natural log of bonus; 
 ∆lnOPTION = yearly change in natural log of stock options; 
 ∆lnRST_STOCK = yearly change in natural log of restricted stock granted; 
 ∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE = yearly change in natural log of shareholder value;   
 POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data 
are from 1993-2000; 
 lnASSETS = natural log of total assets; 
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE = change in natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code, averaged across sample 
years; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio; 
 OWN = executive ownership calculated as shares (excluding stock options) 
owned by executives, divided by total common shares outstanding; 
 CLOSEHELD = a dummy variable equals to 1 if any shareholder owns more than 
20% of the shares; 
 OPTION% = stock options as a percentage of total compensation; 
 TECH = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first three-digit of SIC code is 
737; 
 REGULATED = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first two-digit of SIC code is 
between 4400 and 5000 or between 6000 and 6999; 
 INVEST = total investments calculated as the sum of research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets. 
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Table 5 
Sensitivity between Executive Compensation Components and Accounting Earnings 
 
   
a b c a b c
INTERCEPT 0.005 0.099 *** -0.088 0.103 * -0.311 *** 0.259 ***
(0.14) (3.94) (-1.42) (1.66) (-4.26) (2.83)
∆lnEARNING 0.142 *** 0.000 0.295 *** 0.337 *** 0.214 ** 0.183 *
(3.21) (0.01) (4.06) (4.63) (2.51) (1.71)
POST -0.045 ** -0.103 *** 0.057 -0.213 *** 0.091 ** -0.010
(-2.13) (-7.34) -1.64 (-6.12) (2.24) (-0.19)
lnASSETS 0.010 *** 0.011 *** -0.006 0.025 *** -0.023 *** 0.016 *
(2.80) (4.73) (-1.11) (4.43) (-3.35) (1.86)
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.018 * -0.012 0.027 *
(0.78) (1.23) (0.87) (1.83) (-1.03) (1.87)
BM -0.083 *** -0.062 *** -0.080 ** -0.165 *** 0.034 -0.182 ***
(-4.31) (-4.84) (-2.52) (-5.20) (0.92) (-3.89)
OWN -0.168 -0.621 *** -0.195 -0.965 * -0.559 0.378
(-0.50) (-2.82) (-0.36) (-1.76) (-0.87) (0.47)
CLOSEHELD 0.003 0.051 *** -0.009 0.128 *** -0.037 0.068
(0.10) (2.63) (-0.18) (2.66) (-0.66) (0.96)
OPTION% 0.316 *** -0.088 *** 0.901 *** -0.294 *** 1.825 *** -0.513 ***
(9.69) (-4.07) (16.84) (-5.48) (29.03) (-6.49)
TECH -0.210 *** 0.077 ** -0.400 *** 0.175 ** -0.480 *** -0.241 **
(-4.54) (2.51) (-5.29) (2.31) (-5.40) (-2.15)
REGULATED 0.016 -0.002 0.067 *** -0.004 0.111 *** -0.020
(1.31) (-0.20) (3.23) (-0.18) (4.60) (-0.65)
INVEST -0.064 -0.002 -0.216 * -0.052 -0.201 -0.258
(-0.84) (-0.05) (-1.74) (-0.42) (-1.38) (-1.41)
PERSIST -0.002 0.018 * -0.012 0.032 -0.030 0.033
(-0.14) (1.89) (-0.51) (1.35) (-1.06) (0.95)
0.041 *** 0.033 *** 0.045 * 0.052 ** 0.035 0.076 **
(2.59) (3.13) (1.75) (1.99) (1.16) (1.99)
lnASSETS*∆lnEARNING -0.008 0.011 *** -0.029 *** -0.017 ** -0.030 *** -0.016
(-1.49) (3.40) (-3.55) (-2.01) (-3.14) (-1.28)
BM*∆lnEARNING -0.019 -0.011 -0.026 0.033 0.081 ** -0.172 ***
(-1.08) (-0.95) (-0.88) (1.13) (2.36) (-3.97)
1.002 2.024 *** 0.763 3.290 ** 0.279 -0.160
(1.22) (3.73) (0.57) (2.44) (0.18) (-0.08)
0.043 -0.115 *** 0.115 -0.388 *** -0.035 0.316 ***
(0.90) (-3.62) (1.47) (-4.94) (-0.38) (2.72)
-0.121 *** -0.080 *** -0.098 -0.202 *** 0.035 0.059
(-2.76) (-2.78) (-1.37) (-2.81) (0.42) (0.55)
0.252 ** -0.060 0.298 * -0.144 0.305 0.336
(2.52) (-0.91) (1.82) (-0.88) (1.59) (1.39)
REGULATED*∆lnEARNING 0.056 *** 0.037 *** 0.107 *** 0.136 *** 0.043 0.210 ***
(2.77) (2.77) (3.21) (4.07) (1.08) (4.26)
INVEST*∆lnEARNING 0.012 0.079 -0.028 0.196 0.120 -0.143
(0.10) (1.02) (-0.14) (1.02) (0.53) (-0.50)
PERSIST*∆lnEARNING -0.015 0.002 -0.026 0.004 0.017 -0.064
(-0.70) (0.14) (-0.76) (0.12) (0.43) (-1.26)
n 5,782 5,782 5,782  5,782 5,782   5,782  
Adj.R
2
0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.02
F-value 14.87 *** 20.59 *** 18.97 *** 21.6 *** 42.55 *** 5.64 ***
POST*∆lnEARNING
OWN*∆lnEARNING
CLOSEHELD*∆lnEARNING
OPTION%*∆lnEARNING
TECH*∆lnEARNING
Variable
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQUITY
_COMP
Panel A: Executive Pay Panel B: Executive Pay Components
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
∆lnBONUS ∆lnOPTION
∆lnRST
_STOCK
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T-statistics are in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. 
Year dummies are included in the model but are not tabulated. 
*, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
  
Variable definitions: 
 ∆lnTOTAL_PAY = yearly change in natural log of total executive compensation; 
 ∆lnCASH_COMP = yearly change in natural log of cash compensation, calculated as 
the sum of salaries and bonuses; 
 ∆lnEQUITY_COMP = yearly change in natural log of equity compensation, calculated as 
the sum of stock options and restricted stock granted;   
 ∆lnBONUS = yearly change in natural log of bonus; 
 ∆lnOPTION = yearly change in natural log of stock options; 
 ∆lnRST_STOCK = yearly change in natural log of restricted stock granted;  
 ∆lnEARNING = yearly change in natural log of earnings before nonrecurring items; 
 POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data 
are from 1993-2000; 
 lnASSETS = natural log of total assets; 
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE = change in natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code, averaged across sample 
years; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio; 
 OWN = executive ownership calculated as shares (excluding stock options) 
owned by executives, divided by total common shares outstanding; 
 CLOSEHELD = a dummy variable equals to 1 if any shareholder owns more than 
20% of the shares; 
 OPTION% = stock options as a percentage of total compensation; 
 TECH = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first three-digit of SIC code is 
737; 
 REGULATED = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first two-digit of SIC code is 
between 4400 and 5000 or between 6000 and 6999; 
 INVEST = total investments calculated as the sum of research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets; 
 PERSIST = earnings persistence. 
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Table 6 
Sensitivity between Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value:  
CEO/CFO vs. Other Executives 
 
 
a b c a b c
INTERCEPT -0.066 0.175 *** -0.229 * -0.027 0.065 ** -0.154 **
(-0.78) (3.09) (-1.78) (-0.68) (2.54) (-2.40)
∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE 0.397 ** 0.202 0.349 0.550 *** 0.172 *** 0.637 ***
(2.06) (1.57) (1.19) (6.39) (3.04) (4.52)
POST 0.025 -0.061 * 0.121 -0.043 * -0.051 *** 0.040
(0.50) (-1.79) (1.57) (-1.83) (-3.28) (1.04)
lnASSETS 0.013 * 0.007 0.003 0.012 *** 0.013 *** 0.000
(1.73) (1.44) (0.23) (3.51) (5.37) (0.07)
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE 0.086 0.022 0.066 0.118 *** 0.001 0.125 **
(1.23) (0.48) (0.62) (3.66) (0.02) (2.38)
BM -0.051 -0.049 * -0.025 -0.052 *** -0.043 *** -0.038
(-1.15) (-1.67) (-0.37) (-2.66) (-3.30) (-1.18)
OWN -0.064 -0.276 -0.080 -0.283 -0.730 0.106
(-0.15) (-1.00) (-0.13) (-0.32) (-1.27) (0.07)
CLOSEHELD 0.055 0.017 0.098 0.002 0.032 -0.014
(0.68) (0.32) (0.80) (0.05) (1.60) (-0.27)
OPTION% 0.271 *** -0.115 *** 0.781 *** 0.306 *** -0.085 *** 0.907 ***
(4.08) (-2.60) (7.74) (8.93) (-3.77) (16.16)
TECH -0.100 0.112 * -0.257 * -0.065 * 0.099 *** -0.219 ***
(-1.02) (1.72) (-1.73) (-1.67) (3.87) (-3.43)
REGULATED 0.011 -0.028 0.075 * 0.022 * 0.006 0.054 **
(0.39) (-1.42) (1.67) (1.73) (0.70) (2.56)
INVEST -0.226 -0.069 -0.361 0.004 0.053 -0.174
(-1.42) (-0.65) (-1.49) (0.05) (1.10) (-1.44)
0.101 0.101 ** 0.168 0.114 *** 0.145 *** 0.166 ***
(1.31) (1.97) (1.44) (3.42) (6.61) (3.05)
-0.024 -0.006 -0.032 -0.045 *** -0.008 -0.067 ***
(-1.08) (-0.40) (-0.94) (-4.35) (-1.24) (-3.97)
-0.007 -0.008 0.004 -0.013 * -0.011 ** -0.002
(-0.41) (-0.73) (0.15) (-1.71) (-2.29) (-0.16)
-0.880 0.104 -1.147 0.871 0.773 0.278
(-0.77) (0.14) (-0.66) (0.27) (0.36) (0.05)
-0.215 -0.044 -0.257 -0.210 *** -0.020 -0.238 **
(-0.84) (-0.26) (-0.66) (-2.83) (-0.40) (-1.96)
-0.355 ** 0.038 -0.335 -0.169 * 0.114 * -0.130
(-2.02) (0.33) (-1.25) (-1.90) (1.95) (-0.89)
-0.427 * -0.494 *** -0.478 0.154 * -0.244 *** 0.282 *
(-1.91) (-3.32) (-1.41) (1.72) (-4.13) (1.92)
0.081 0.014 0.116 0.034 -0.008 0.108
(0.87) (0.23) (0.82) (0.84) (-0.31) (1.63)
0.726 * -0.049 1.332 ** -0.514 *** -0.320 *** -0.337
(1.81) (-0.18) (2.19) (-2.88) (-2.72) (-1.15)
n 1,283 1,283 1,283 4,589 4,589 4,589 
Adj.R
2
0.07 0.10 .08 0.07 0.09 0.09
F-value 3.89 *** 5.35 *** 4.59 *** 11.58 *** 16.28 *** 14.92 ***
CLOSEHELD
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
OPTION%
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
Panel A: CEO / CFO Panel B: Other Executives
Variable
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQ
_COMP
TECH
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
REGULATED
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
INVEST
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQ
_COMP
POST
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
lnASSETS
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
BM
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
OWN
    *∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE
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T-statistics are in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. 
Year dummies are included in the model but are not tabulated. 
*, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
  
Variable definitions: 
 ∆lnTOTAL_PAY = yearly change in natural log of total executive compensation; 
 ∆lnCASH_COMP = yearly change in natural log of cash compensation, calculated as 
the sum of salaries and bonuses; 
 ∆lnEQUITY_COMP = yearly change in natural log of equity compensation, calculated as 
the sum of stock options and restricted stock granted;  
 ∆lnSHRHLDR_VALUE = yearly change in natural log of shareholder value;   
 POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data 
are from 1993-2000; 
 lnASSETS = natural log of total assets; 
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE = change in natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code, averaged across sample 
years; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio; 
 OWN = executive ownership calculated as shares (excluding stock options) 
owned by executives, divided by total common shares outstanding; 
 CLOSEHELD = a dummy variable equals to 1 if any shareholder owns more than 
20% of the shares; 
 OPTION% = stock options as a percentage of total compensation; 
 TECH = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first three-digit of SIC code is 
737; 
 REGULATED = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first two-digit of SIC code is 
between 4400 and 5000 or between 6000 and 6999; 
 INVEST = total investments calculated as the sum of research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets. 
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Table 7 
Sensitivity between Executive Compensation and Accounting Earnings: 
CEO/CFO vs. Other Executives 
 
 
a b c a b c
INTERCEPT 0.027 0.194 *** -0.061 0.006 0.080 *** -0.089
(0.31) (3.23) (-0.44) (0.14) (2.89) (-1.27)
∆lnEARNING 0.046 -0.091 0.161 0.169 *** 0.017 0.317 ***
(0.33) (-0.98) (0.75) (3.49) (0.54) (3.93)
POST -0.016 -0.122 *** 0.081 -0.056 ** -0.100 *** 0.048
(-0.32) (-3.69) (1.06) (-2.38) (-6.48) (1.25)
lnASSETS 0.006 0.004 -0.013 0.011 *** 0.012 *** -0.005
(0.74) (0.80) (-1.03) (2.75) (4.88) (-0.78)
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE 0.018 0.013 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.002
(1.27) (1.33) (1.27) (0.08) (0.59) (0.22)
BM -0.106 ** -0.093 *** -0.086 -0.076 *** -0.052 *** -0.074 **
(-2.35) (-3.07) (-1.22) (-3.55) (-3.75) (-2.08)
OWN -0.102 -0.622 ** -0.045 -0.966 -1.520 ** -1.209
(-0.23) (-2.09) (-0.07) (-1.01) (-2.42) (-0.76)
CLOSEHELD 0.008 0.049 0.009 0.003 0.058 *** -0.014
(0.10) (0.95) (0.07) (0.11) (2.81) (-0.27)
OPTION% 0.328 *** -0.112 ** 0.878 *** 0.303 *** -0.091 *** 0.906 ***
(4.72) (-2.40) (8.10) (8.03) (-3.67) (14.41)
TECH -0.261 ** 0.041 -0.443 *** -0.194 *** 0.089 *** -0.380 ***
(-2.49) (0.58) (-2.71) (-3.76) (2.62) (-4.42)
REGULATED -0.006 -0.024 0.051 0.022 0.005 0.071 ***
(-0.21) (-1.20) (1.08) (1.62) (0.53) (3.11)
INVEST -0.211 -0.104 -0.308 -0.018 0.034 -0.188
(-1.23) (-0.91) (-1.15) (-0.22) (0.62) (-1.34)
PERSIST 0.000 0.033 0.009 -0.003 0.014 -0.021
(-0.01) (1.43) (0.16) (-0.22) (1.35) (-0.77)
0.024 0.073 *** 0.020 0.046 *** 0.023 ** 0.053 *
(0.61) (2.74) (0.33) (2.65) (2.04) (1.86)
lnASSETS*∆lnEARNING 0.005 0.015 -0.004 -0.011 ** 0.011 *** -0.035 ***
(0.34) (1.52) (-0.16) (-2.01) (3.03) (-3.80)
BM*∆lnEARNING -0.011 0.010 -0.072 -0.021 -0.016 -0.010
(-0.25) (0.33) (-1.01) (-1.05) (-1.22) (-0.31)
0.876 2.351 *** 0.507 0.425 1.853 1.158
(0.74) (2.97) (0.28) (0.23) (1.55) (0.38)
0.029 -0.301 *** 0.122 0.051 -0.086 *** 0.123
(0.19) (-2.97) (0.51) (1.01) (-2.60) (1.48)
-0.216 ** -0.051 -0.303 * -0.090 * -0.085 *** -0.036
(-2.10) (-0.74) (-1.89) (-1.81) (-2.60) (-0.44)
0.276 -0.168 0.013 0.231 ** -0.053 0.284
(0.77) (-0.70) (0.02) (2.23) (-0.78) (1.64)
REGULATED*∆lnEARNING 0.171 *** 0.098 *** 0.251 *** 0.032 0.023 0.074 **
(3.08) (2.64) (2.89) (1.48) (1.63) (2.03)
INVEST*∆lnEARNING 0.108 0.300 0.055 -0.011 0.013 -0.035
(0.39) (1.63) (0.13) (-0.09) (0.15) (-0.16)
PERSIST*∆lnEARNING -0.002 0.001 -0.020 -0.012 0.003 -0.018
(-0.04) (0.03) (-0.24) (-0.53) (0.21) (-0.47)
n 1,522 1,522 1,522  5,408 5,408 5,408  
Adj.R
2
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08
F-value 4.39 *** 4.79 *** 4.94 *** 14.44 *** 13.61 *** 17.48 ***
OPTION%*∆lnEARNING
TECH*∆lnEARNING
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQUITY
_COMP
POST*∆lnEARNING
OWN*∆lnEARNING
CLOSEHELD*∆lnEARNING
Panel A: CEO / CFO Panel B: Other Executives
Variable
∆lnTOTAL
_PAY
∆lnCASH
_COMP
∆lnEQUITY
_COMP
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T-statistics are in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. 
Year dummies are included in the model but are not tabulated. 
*, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
  
Variable definitions: 
 ∆lnTOTAL_PAY = yearly change in natural log of total executive compensation; 
 ∆lnCASH_COMP = yearly change in natural log of cash compensation, calculated as 
the sum of salaries and bonuses; 
 ∆lnEQUITY_COMP = yearly change in natural log of equity compensation, calculated as 
the sum of stock options and restricted stock granted;  
 ∆lnEARNING = yearly change in natural log of earnings before nonrecurring items; 
 POST =  a dummy variable equals to 1 if data are from 2003-2005; 0 if data 
are from 1993-2000; 
 lnASSETS = natural log of total assets; 
∆lnIND_PERFORMANCE = change in natural log of shareholder value of all Compustat 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code, averaged across sample 
years; 
 BM = book-to-market ratio; 
 OWN = executive ownership calculated as shares (excluding stock options) 
owned by executives, divided by total common shares outstanding; 
 CLOSEHELD = a dummy variable equals to 1 if any shareholder owns more than 
20% of the shares; 
 OPTION% = stock options as a percentage of total compensation; 
 TECH = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first three-digit of SIC code is 
737; 
 REGULATED = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the first two-digit of SIC code is 
between 4400 and 5000 or between 6000 and 6999; 
 INVEST = total investments calculated as the sum of research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets; 
 PERSIST = earnings persistence. 
 
